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ABSTRACT: A key provision of the Affordable Care Act is the establishment of the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program, which provides incentives for improved quality and efficiency to a new 
category of provider—the accountable care organization (ACO). The program, slated to begin in 
January 2012, rewards groups of providers who agree to collaborate to offer more accountable, 
effective, and efficient care with a share of the savings they achieve. While the prospect of 
participating in this initiative has generated a groundswell of interest and activity among 
providers, many issues need to be addressed about the methods that will be used to determine 
how that accountability is to be achieved, assessed, and rewarded. This report provides 
recommendations for ensuring the successful implementation and spread of ACOs to achieve the 
goals of a high performance health system. 
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PREFACE 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Affordable Care Act) enacted 
several key changes intended to help achieve a high performance health system. Such a 
system includes affordable coverage for all; alignment of incentives to promote quality, 
efficiency, and cost control; increased accountability for the quality and cost of care; 
improved coordination; and effective leadership in developing and implementing policies 
to improve system performance. These objectives have been laid out by the Commission 
on a High Performance Health System in a series of reports, beginning in August 2006 
with a Framework for a High Performance Health System for the United States and 
continuing with A High Performance Health System for the United States: An Ambitious 
Agenda for the Next President in November 2007. The Commission’s February 2009 
report, The Path to a High Performance U.S. Health System: A 2020 Vision and the 
Policies to Pave the Way, contained an explicit set of recommendations, many of which 
appeared in the health reform legislation. 
 
A key provision of the Affordable Care Act is the establishment of the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program, which provides incentives for improved quality and efficiency to a new 
category of provider: the accountable care organization (ACO). The program, slated to 
begin in January 2012, rewards groups of providers with a share of the savings they 
achieve by collaborating to offer more accountable, effective, and efficient care. While 
the prospect of participating in this initiative has generated a groundswell of interest and 
activity among providers throughout the country, the requirements for the program have 
raised questions about what an ACO is, what it ought to be accountable for, and how that 
accountability is to be achieved, assessed, and rewarded. 
 
This report sets forth the rationale for creating ACOs, describes several promising models 
that should be considered for use by ACOs, and contains a set of recommendations on 
what ought to be expected from ACOs and how to ensure their successful implementation 
and spread, both immediately and over time. Although the report’s primary audience is the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which has responsibility for implementing 
the program, it is also intended to offer information and guidance to providers, payers, 
and patients who will be forming and interacting with ACOs. 
 
James J. Mongan, M.D.     Stuart Guterman 
Chairman       Executive Director 
The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Affordable Care Act) 
establishes a new category of provider within the Medicare program—the accountable 
care organization (ACO)—with rules for provider participation and principles for sharing 
the savings that ensue from this new form of health care delivery. A broad framework is 
specified in the law and more details have been laid out in proposed rules released by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), but whether the promise of this new 
payment and delivery model is realized will depend both on the implementation decisions 
made over time by CMS and the willingness and ability of health care providers, other 
payers, and the general public to respond to this opportunity to improve the performance 
of the health care system. 
 
This report by the Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health 
System (Commission): 1) sets forth the rationale for creating ACOs; 2) describes several 
promising types of ACO models that should be considered and evaluated as part of an 
effort to facilitate adaptability and spread of accountability for quality and cost to as wide 
a segment of the U.S. health care delivery system as possible; and 3) concludes with a set 
of Commission recommendations on what ought to be expected from ACOs and how to 
ensure their successful implementation and spread, both immediately and over time. 
Although the Commission’s recommendations are addressed, for the most part, to CMS, 
the report also is intended to offer information and guidance to providers, payers, and 
patients who will be forming, and interacting with, ACOs. 
 
RATIONALE 
Systematization and organization of care delivery would make it easier to provide the 
high-quality, coordinated care that the American public seeks and needs. Currently, even 
when individual services meet high standards of clinical quality, there is often 
insufficient coordination of care across settings and over time to meet the needs of 
patients. More highly developed primary care services, both in the United States and in 
other countries, are associated with better clinical outcomes and lower costs—which are 
major objectives of the Affordable Care Act. Indeed, nearly all patients—nine of 10—
report that it is important to them to have one place or personal physician responsible for 
their primary care and for coordinating their care with other providers, that all physicians 
involved in their care have access to their medical information, and that they have a 
place—other than the emergency room—to go for care at night and on weekends. 
 
 x 
Within the United States, we have evidence that reorganizing care around the patient with 
teams that are accountable to each other and to patients and are supported by information 
systems that guide and drive improvement, has the potential to eliminate waste, reduce 
medical errors, and improve outcomes—at lower total cost. Accomplishing this requires 
changing the incentives upon which the health care system is built. The fee-for-service 
payment that currently typifies the U.S. health system emphasizes the provision of health 
services by individual providers rather than coordinated teams of providers who collaborate 
to address patients’ needs. The current system also encourages the provision of more 
health services but not the achievement of better health outcomes, and tends to focus on 
acute care and complex services, rather than prevention, primary care, and serving the 
ongoing needs of the population. 
 
PROMISING ORGANIZATIONAL AND PAYMENT MODELS 
Previous work by The Commonwealth Fund and this Commission has shown that 
organized and accountable health care delivery holds significant potential for transforming 
the U.S. health care system. In recognition of this potential, the Affordable Care Act 
provides incentives under the Medicare program for provider organizations to be 
accountable for the total care of patients, including population health outcomes, patient 
care experiences, and the cost per person. While CMS has substantial discretion to set the 
requirements for qualifying ACOs, the law establishes an ACO as a legally established 
provider organization that is directly responsible for providing many of the services 
covered by the Medicare program and can ensure that its patients have access to the rest. 
ACOs differ from health maintenance organizations in that they are explicitly health care 
delivery organizations, rather than insurers that contract with a network of providers. 
 
Providers’ participation in an ACO is voluntary. The ACO is required to have sufficient 
primary care providers to care for Medicare beneficiaries and is held accountable for the 
quality and cost of care for the Medicare patients of those primary care providers. The 
law sets out several ACO models (including networks of individual practices, group 
practices, and hospitals partnering with providers or employing providers), and gives the 
secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) further discretion to approve other groups 
of providers. The law also provides for Medicaid ACOs for pediatric patients, although 
that provision is not addressed in this report. 
 
Many specific decisions about qualifying ACOs are left to the discretion of the secretary. 
In particular, the law does not restrict beneficiary choice of providers to those 
participating in or contracting with the ACO to which their primary care provider 
 xi 
belongs. Nor is there a requirement that the ACO include or contract with all of the 
providers who care for the patient: the ACO could consist of a network of primary care 
physicians, multispecialty physician group practices without hospitals or the full panoply 
of specialists, or hospitals that employ physicians or partner with physician groups. 
 
The law does specify that there will be a mechanism to distribute shared savings achieved 
by the ACO, but many of the related details are not completely specified. Providers might 
be paid directly by Medicare as they are now or Medicare might choose to use new 
provider payment models. Providers could assign their payments to the ACO, which then 
would receive all Medicare payments, both for direct care and for shared savings, with 
the ACO responsible for compensating providers through salaries or another internally 
set remuneration and/or incentive system. Alternatively, the ACO could elect to receive a 
partial capitation payment from Medicare that includes both shared savings (on the fee-
for-service portion of the payment) and financial risk (on the per-patient portion), or a 
global fee (with full financial risk). 
 
When patients receive services from providers outside the ACO, Medicare might 
continue to pay for those services (e.g., hospital care, home health care, or non-ACO 
specialists) as it does now, while adjusting the partial capitation payments or global fee to 
the ACO for any “out-of-organization” care. Alternatively, the ACO might be required to 
contract with and pay out-of-organization providers to ensure access to a full range of 
coordinated care. 
 
This report addresses how CMS might make important decisions about payment and 
delivery system design. It describes three organizational models that could be promising 
for ACOs: advanced primary care practice networks with infrastructure support and 
associated specialist referral networks; multispecialty physician group practices; and 
health care organizations with functionally integrated ambulatory, inpatient, and 
postacute care services. Correspondingly, several alternative options could be used in the 
ACO context, including: 
 
• Primary care medical home fees, any of several methods for paying primary care 
providers that encourages them to coordinate their patients’ care. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Michigan and Community Care of North Carolina are two organizations 
that have used such payment methods with success. 
 xii 
• Bundled acute case rates, which cover a range of services related to treatment for a 
patient during a specified time interval around an acute care event, like a hospital 
admission. Geisinger Health System in Pennsylvania uses this method. 
• Global fees, a payment rate that covers all the health care provided to an individual 
during a specified time interval. Examples of organizations using global fees include 
HealthPartners in Minnesota, Intermountain Healthcare in Utah, Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts, and Kaiser Permanente in eight regions around the country. 
 
While ACOs receiving partial capitation or global fees share in both savings and financial 
risk, Medicare might mitigate the risk of being accountable for high-cost patients through 
reinsurance or stop-loss provisions, especially for cases in which the ACO does not 
directly provide the full range of services. This would be consistent with CMS’s proposed 
rule for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, which in the first two years would cap 
potential losses for ACOs that opt to both receive a share of any savings and be 
responsible for a share of excess spending; in the third year, potential losses would be 
capped for all ACOs, which will be required to share in savings and be responsible for a 
share of excess spending. 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Affordable Care Act builds on innovations already under way across the country and 
contains a number of requirements for extending successful ACO payment concepts to 
qualifying organizations. CMS can further support the success and spread of high-
performing ACOs through its regulations and practices. The objective is to achieve a high 
performance health system that is organized to attain better health, better care, and lower 
costs. To facilitate this process, the Commission makes the following recommendations 
(Exhibit ES-1): 
 
1. Strong Primary Care Foundation 
1a. CMS should ensure that all ACOs have a strong primary care foundation that 
builds on the concept of the patient-centered medical home. 
1b. Although CMS may require that ACOs have certain structural characteristics 
(e.g., electronic medical records and availability of after-hours care) or have 
certain processes in place (e.g., quality improvement programs), the availability 
and accessibility to patients of a regular source of care and the ability of that 
provider to coordinate care received from all sources should be paramount. 
 
 xiii 
 
2. Accountability for Quality of Care, Patient Care Experiences, Population 
Outcomes, and Total Costs 
2a. All participating ACOs should be required to agree to and be able to report 
measures of quality of care, patient care experiences, and outcomes, or have 
arrangements in place to enable such reporting. 
2b. Shared savings should be distributed contingent on high quality and positive 
patient experiences. 
2c. CMS (along with other participating payers) should work with each ACO to 
ensure that incentives for providers within the ACO are aligned and consistent 
with the aims of better health, better care, and lower costs. 
2d. Regardless of which payers are involved in the ACO payment mechanism, the 
shared savings paid out by each payer or group of payers should, to the extent 
feasible, take into account the ability of the ACO to achieve overall savings on 
total costs, rather than just savings for individual payers. 
 
 
 
Overall goal: to achieve a high performance health system that is organized to 
attain better health, better care, and lower costs
1. Strong Primary Care Foundation
2. Accountability for Quality of Care, Patient Care Experiences, Population 
Outcomes, and Total Costs
3. Informed and Engaged Patients
4. Commitment to Serving the Community
5. Criteria for Entry and Continued Participation That Emphasize Accountability 
and Performance
6. Multipayer Alignment to Provide Appropriate and Consistent Incentives
7. Payment That Reinforces and Rewards High Performance
8. Innovative Payment Methods and Organizational Models
9. Balanced Physician Compensation Incentives
10. Timely Monitoring, Data Feedback, and Technical Support for Improvement
Exhibit ES-1. Commission Recommendations
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3. Informed and Engaged Patients 
3a. Providers should notify all of their patients that the providers belong to a given 
ACO, along with its characteristics and what that will mean for the care that 
patients will receive. 
3b. ACOs should encourage providers and patients to specify expectations and 
responsibilities, and engage providers and patients as partners in ensuring the 
best care and outcomes. 
3c. CMS should test different approaches for encouraging patients to designate an 
ACO as the principal source of their care by providing positive incentives to do 
so (such as enhanced benefits or lower cost-sharing responsibility). Patients 
should retain the right to seek care from the providers of their choice, including 
those not participating in the ACO, unless they explicitly agree to receive care 
exclusively from the ACO’s providers. 
 
4. Commitment to Serving the Community 
CMS should make an explicit commitment to serving its community, including low-
income and uninsured patients, an integral part of qualifying as an ACO. 
 
5. Criteria for Entry and Continued Participation That Emphasize Accountability 
and Performance 
Entry criteria for ACOs should include, at a minimum, the availability of primary 
care and the capacity of the organization to ensure that patients have access to needed 
services across the continuum of care, as well as the ability to provide meaningful 
evidence of quality (including patient experiences and outcomes) and cost 
performance. Continued participation and financial rewards should be contingent on 
performance and accountability rather than structural characteristics. This should 
include public reporting of performance metrics. 
 
6. Multipayer Alignment to Provide Appropriate and Consistent Incentives 
CMS should actively work with providers and payers in each major market to 
develop multipayer ACO arrangements—including Medicare, Medicaid, and private 
payers—whenever possible. Such arrangements should be designed to align 
incentives among payers, give a clear and consistent message to ACOs, and enable 
them to focus on achieving higher quality of care, better patient care experiences, 
improved population health outcomes, and lower costs for all their patients, as well as 
simplifying administrative processes. 
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7. Payment That Reinforces and Rewards High Performance 
7a. The threshold for attributing savings to ACOs should be set to reflect the 
predictability and reliability of each organization’s cost trend, to protect against 
shared-savings payments that are generated by random fluctuations in year-to-
year costs, while ensuring that organizations are rewarded for achieving actual 
cost reductions. 
7b. The determination and payment of shared savings should be accomplished so 
that the reward for reducing costs while improving quality is received with as 
little delay as possible from the behavior that generates it. This can be supported 
by prospectively determining the patients whose costs are to be used to calculate 
shared savings and prospectively setting the spending target for each ACO. 
7c. CMS (along with other participating payers) should make upfront support, 
possibly as low-cost loans against future shared savings, available to 
organizations that, because of certain circumstances, need it to offset the 
infrastructure investment expense required to redesign care processes and make 
other changes so they can become successful ACOs. Determination of the 
availability and extent of upfront support and the basis on which it is provided 
(e.g., loans vs. grants) may differ by whether it is a safety-net institution serving 
underserved populations, as well as by other defining characteristics of the 
organization, subject to the organization’s potential for achieving the program’s 
goals and its proposed plan for doing so. 
 
8. Innovative Payment Methods and Organizational Models 
CMS should be prepared to apply different payment approaches that are suitable for 
different organizational configurations of ACOs in different geographic areas and 
different circumstances, as appropriate. These payment approaches could include 
primary care medical home fees or bundled acute case rates, along with shared 
savings, or risk-adjusted global fees with risk mitigation (e.g., stop-loss or reinsurance). 
All approaches should make payments contingent on reaching quality benchmarks. 
 
9. Balanced Physician Compensation Incentives  
For ACOs receiving payment for direct care as well as shared savings, compensation 
of clinicians within the ACO should include incentives to deliver evidence-based care 
but ensure that appropriate care is not withheld. 
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10. Timely Monitoring, Data Feedback, and Technical Support for Improvement 
10a. CMS should provide baseline data as well as early and regular reports on total 
Medicare payments, utilization, and quality measures for the ACO patient 
population, and other data required to help ACOs be successful in achieving the 
aims of better health, better care, and lower costs; other payers should do the 
same. Trends should be tracked over time to assess the impact of alternative 
payment models and different configurations of ACOs and disseminate learning 
about the most effective strategies. 
10b. CMS should work with other payers to develop robust information exchanges 
and standardized reports that can provide ACOs with timely feedback on 
comparative results, support rapid-cycle improvements in quality and cost 
performance, and develop new knowledge on effective and efficient  
clinical practices. 
10c. The Department of Health and Human Services, through its Office of the 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, should provide 
technical assistance for implementing electronic information systems and 
exchanges to facilitate transfer of critical clinical information. 
10d. CMS should create toolkits of interventions and practices that health care 
organizations have found effective in improving quality and lowering costs. All 
payers should collaborate to provide technical assistance to organizations to 
help them identify and adopt effective and efficient practices and to spread 
successful innovations in payment methods and organizational models. 
10e. Every effort should be made by public and private payers, as well as providers, to 
ensure transparency of information and to minimize administrative complexity. 
 
CONCLUSION 
To meet population health needs now and in the future, the U.S. health care delivery 
system has to become accountable for three things: delivering high-quality, effective, and 
safe care that contributes to the best possible population health outcomes; configuring 
itself for the benefit of patients to provide excellent patient experiences with care; and 
using resources efficiently and prudently. Substantial evidence exists that it is possible to 
improve the way health care is organized and delivered to slow the growth of health care 
costs while improving outcomes and patient experiences. By adopting these objectives as 
core values and achieving increasingly stringent goals in each area, it will be possible to 
provide affordable health care into the future with access for all and care that helps to 
prevent illness, restore health for those with acute conditions, and maintain health and 
 xvii 
productivity for all, including the growing population of patients with one or more 
chronic conditions. 
 
Holding the health care system accountable through new payment arrangements that 
support high value rather than high-volume care creates the promise of transforming the 
U.S. health system to achieve these aims. Yet, much work needs to be done to establish 
and spread ACOs and learn from innovative care systems. Success requires the 
development of trust among all the parties, as well as a willingness to test multiple 
approaches, measure results, and adapt rapidly to improve performance. Government 
leadership and flexibility are essential, as are activated and engaged clinicians and 
patients who embrace accountability for better care and health outcomes. If all this 
occurs, moving ACOs from concept to action can play an instrumental role in achieving a 
high performance U.S. health system over the coming decade. 
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HIGH PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABLE CARE: 
BUILDING ON SUCCESS AND LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Affordable Care Act) 
establishes a new category of provider within the Medicare program—the accountable 
care organization (ACO).1 The law provides rules governing the types of providers that 
compose an ACO and the principles for sharing savings that result from this new form of 
health care delivery. A broad framework for ACOs is specified in the law, and more 
details have been laid out in proposed rules released by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS);2
 
 but whether the promise of this new payment and delivery 
model is realized will depend not only on the implementation decisions made over time 
by CMS but also on the willingness and ability of health care providers, other payers, and 
the general public to respond to this opportunity to improve the performance of the health 
care system. 
The law sets forth a number of requirements for participating ACOs (Exhibit 1). To be 
eligible, an ACO must have a mechanism for shared governance, and may include 
professionals in group practice arrangements, networks of individual practices of ACO 
professionals (i.e., physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, or clinical nurse 
specialists), hospitals employing ACO professionals, or partnerships or joint venture 
arrangements between hospitals and ACO professionals. The ACO must include 
sufficient primary care providers to care for a defined population and be willing to be 
accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries assigned to it for a period of at least three years. The organization must have 
a formal legal structure allowing it to distribute shared savings and have a leadership and 
management structure that includes clinical and administrative systems with the capacity 
to report information on participating professionals, quality of care, use and cost, and 
other information required for the determination of savings. The law further stipulates 
that ACOs define processes to promote evidence-based medicine and patient 
engagement, and meet various patient-centered criteria specified by the secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). 
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Exhibit 1. Statutory Requirements for Medicare ACOs 
 
1. Groups of providers of services and suppliers, which can include: 
a. Physicians and other practitioners (referred to as ACO professionals) in group 
practice arrangements; 
b. Networks of individual practices of ACO professionals; 
c. Partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and ACO 
professionals; 
d. Hospitals employing ACO professionals; or 
e. Other groups of providers of services and suppliers deemed appropriate by the 
secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
2. Willingness to become accountable for the quality, costs, and overall care of 
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to it based on their utilization of 
primary care services. 
3. Agreement to participate in the program for a minimum of three years. 
4. A formal legal structure that would allow the organization to receive and distribute 
payments for shared savings to participating providers of services and suppliers. 
5. Inclusion of primary care ACO professionals that are sufficient for the number of 
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries (a minimum of 5,000) assigned to it. 
6. Provision to HHS of information necessary to determine the Medicare beneficiaries 
for which the organization is responsible, the implementation of quality and other 
reporting requirements, and determination of payments for shared savings. 
a. Quality measures may include clinical processes and outcomes, patient and 
caregiver experience of care, and utilization measures such as hospital 
admissions for ambulatory care–sensitive conditions. 
b. Additional quality measures may include care transitions, hospital discharge 
planning, and post-hospital discharge follow-up. 
7. A leadership and management structure that includes clinical and administrative 
systems. 
8. Processes to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement, report on 
quality and cost measures, and coordinate care. 
9. Demonstration that the organization meets patient-centeredness criteria specified by 
the secretary. 
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Under the new law, ACOs can participate in a shared-savings program, under which each 
ACO receives a portion of the savings it achieves on Medicare Part A and B expenditures 
for its patients relative to a spending target, contingent on quality standards specified by 
CMS. In addition, the law tasks the new CMS Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation (Innovation Center) with developing and testing alternative payment models 
for future use in paying ACOs. 
 
This report by the Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health 
System (Commission): 1) sets forth the rationale for creating ACOs; 2) describes several 
promising types of ACO models that should be considered and evaluated to facilitate the 
adaptability and spread of accountability for quality and cost to as wide a segment of the 
U.S. health care delivery system as possible; and 3) concludes with a set of Commission 
recommendations on how to ensure the successful implementation and spread of ACOs. 
Although the Commission’s recommendations are addressed, for the most part, to CMS, 
the report also is intended to offer information and guidance to providers, payers, and 
patients who will be forming, and interacting with, ACOs. 
 
RATIONALE FOR CREATING ACOS 
Increased organization of health care delivery should make it easier to provide high-
quality, coordinated care—which often is not available to patients in the United States 
(Exhibit 2).3
 
 Currently, even when individual services meet high standards of clinical 
quality, there is often insufficient coordination of care across providers, services, and 
settings to efficiently and effectively meet the needs of patients. More highly developed 
primary care services, both in the United States and in other countries, are associated with 
better clinical outcomes and lower costs—both of which are major objectives of the 
Affordable Care Act. Nearly all patients—nine of 10—report that it is important to have 
one place or personal physician responsible for delivering their primary care and 
coordinating their care, that all physicians involved in their care have access to their 
medical information, and that they have a place—other than the emergency room—for 
care at night and on weekends (Exhibit 3). People do want choice of their personal 
physician and many want to be informed, active participants in decisions about their 
care—but few want to be on their own navigating our complex health care system. 
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Percent reporting it is
very important/important that:
Total:
Very important
or important
Very 
important Important
You have one place/doctor responsible for 
primary care and coordinating care 93 64 29
On nights and weekends, you have a place to go 
other than the emergency room 85 54 31
All your doctors have easy access to your medical 
records 96 70 26
You have information about the quality of care 
provided by different doctors/hospitals 96 58 38
You have information about the costs to you of 
care before you actually get care
89 58 31
Exhibit 3. Majority Support More Accessible, Coordinated,
and Well-Informed Care
Source: K. Stremikis, C. Schoen, and A.-K. Fryer, A Call for Change: The 2011 Commonwealth Fund Survey of 
Public Views of the U.S. Health System (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, April 2011).
Number of doctors seen
Percent reporting in past two years: Any 1 to 2 3 or more
After medical test, no one called or wrote you about results, 
or you had to call repeatedly to get results 27 21 36
Doctors failed to provide important information about your 
medical history or test results to other doctors or nurses you 
think should have it
23 22 26
Test results or medical records were not available at the 
time of scheduled appointment 18 14 29
Your primary care physician did not receive a report back 
from a specialist you saw 15 11 24
Your specialist did not receive basic medical information 
from your primary care doctor 12 9 18
Any of the above 47 42 55
Exhibit 2. Poor Coordination of Care Is Common,
Especially if Multiple Doctors Are Involved
Source: K. Stremikis, C. Schoen, and A.-K. Fryer, A Call for Change: The 2011 Commonwealth Fund Survey of 
Public Views of the U.S. Health System (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, April 2011).
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Within the United States, we have evidence that reorganizing care around the patient—
using teams that are accountable to each other and to their patients for the effectiveness 
and efficiency of care and are supported by information systems that guide and drive 
improvement—has the potential to eliminate waste, reduce medical errors, and improve 
outcomes—at a lower total cost of care.4
 
 Accomplishing this requires changing the 
payment system that drives how health care is organized and provided. The fee-for-
service payment that currently typifies the U.S. health system emphasizes the provision 
of health services by individual providers rather than coordinated teams that work across 
providers and settings to address the patient’s needs. The current system encourages the 
provision of more health services but not the achievement of better health outcomes. It 
also favors more complex services rather than prevention and primary care. Moreover, 
fee-for-service payment focuses on providing acute care, rather than serving the ongoing 
needs of the population. 
Payment for health care and the organization of the delivery system that provides that 
care are interdependent. Payment incentives influence the organization of care and the 
use of resources and, in turn, the types of organizations in which providers practice affect 
their ability to respond appropriately to different types of payment incentives (Exhibit 4). 
As payment methods change, those who provide care will innovate in response to new 
incentives. Just as providers have responded to the incentives embedded in the current 
fee-for-service mechanism by steadily increasing the volume and intensity of services 
provided in a fragmented health care delivery system, new and different incentives can 
encourage providers to work together, either in formal organizations or in virtual systems 
of care. These new incentives will spur providers to take broader responsibility for the 
patients they treat and the resources they use—and benefit from doing so. 
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As organizational arrangements evolve, payment methods can be adjusted to encourage 
and reward increasing levels of accountability for cost and quality of care, leading to 
continuous improvement over time. To accomplish those aims, more innovative payment 
approaches can be offered to providers in organizational arrangements that are more 
capable of taking on and successfully responding to these new incentives and producing 
more favorable outcomes of care. 
 
The challenge is to design both financial and nonfinancial incentives that will bring 
providers together in an ACO, keep them in an ACO, and enable the ACO to move 
progressively to increased levels of accountability for its performance that reflect the 
Triple Aim set forth by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement: enhanced experience of 
care, improved health of populations, and reduced per capita health care costs.5
 
 Given the 
diversity of existing provider systems and communities of patients and caregivers, one 
must consider the incentives that should be available to individual providers and small 
provider organizations, as well as to larger, integrated systems, to ensure that all move 
progressively from fragmented care to more accessible, coordinated, patient-centered care. 
THE 
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
Exhibit 4. Relationship Between Payment Methods 
and Organizational Models
Risk-
adjusted 
global fees
Medical 
home fees 
and bundled 
acute case 
rates
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for-service 
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Continuum of Organizational Models
Advanced 
primary care 
networks
Multispecialty physician 
group practices with 
hospital affiliation
Integrated systems 
with ambulatory, 
inpatient, and 
postacute care
C
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ards for 
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Quality bonuses 
for outcomes; 
large percent of 
savings, some 
shared risk
Quality bonus for 
prevention, chronic 
conditions; small 
percent of shared 
savings
Quality bonuses 
for coordination 
and intermediate 
outcome measures; 
moderate percent 
of shared savings
Less Feasible
More Feasible
Source: Adapted from A. Shih, K. Davis, S. Schoenbaum, A. Gauthier, R. Nuzum, and D. McCarthy, Organizing 
the U.S. Health Care Delivery System for High Performance (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, Aug. 2008).
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In the future, transparency will need to be an essential feature of the U.S. health care 
delivery system so that, as ACOs develop, patients are comfortable getting their care 
from providers in the various organizational arrangements that result. Organizing care 
with accountability to patients and the public will require providers to make positive care 
experiences and improved outcomes central goals. It will also require payers to align 
payment incentives with those goals. 
 
The Commission’s February 2009 report, The Path to a High Performance U.S. Health 
System: A 2020 Vision and the Policies to Pave the Way, recommended changing the way 
we pay for health care to reward high quality and prudent stewardship of resources and to 
encourage more coordinated health care delivery.6
 
 The Commission’s recommendations 
included the following payment reforms: 
• Strengthen and reinforce primary care by revising the Medicare fee schedule to 
enhance payment for primary care services and ensure annual increases that keep 
pace with the cost of efficient practice; 
• Institute new methods of paying for primary care that encourage adoption of the 
medical home model and promote more accessible, coordinated, patient-centered 
care, with a focus on health and disease prevention; and 
• Promote more effective, efficient, and integrated health care delivery by adopting 
more bundled-payment approaches to paying for care over a period of time or for the 
duration of an illness, with rewards for quality, outcomes, and efficiency. 
 
Those recommendations were reflected in several of the provisions incorporated in the 
Affordable Care Act.7 Among the most important of these provisions are: the creation of 
the Innovation Center to develop and rapidly implement pilots of new methods of 
provider payment, a requirement to engage in value-based purchasing, and the 
establishment of the shared-savings program for ACOs. Together, they move the 
emphasis away from the current fee-for-service system and its adverse incentives and 
toward mechanisms meant to spur the reorganization and reorientation of the health care 
delivery system so that it becomes focused on more effective, efficient, patient-centered 
care and results in slower growth in national health spending.8 Giving providers both the 
incentive and the means to reach benchmark levels of quality and efficiency is a key 
objective of a comprehensive health reform package that also puts in place public health 
measures to promote health and prevent disease.9
 
 All are essential for achieving the law’s 
most important objective: ensuring affordable, sustainable insurance coverage for all. 
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Given the extent of the payment and delivery system changes that are required, a period of 
testing new models is sensible, so that the design, implementation, and impact of multiple 
options can be considered and the potential pitfalls associated with any major change can 
be avoided. A principal concern is that moving away from fee-for-service payment will 
create incentives for under-provision of needed care, just as the current system to the over-
provision of services, including duplicative, unnecessary, and avoidable care. Finding the 
right balance of incentives and safeguards will require careful planning, monitoring, and 
examination. No one solution will fit every area of the country, provider, or patient. The 
size, scope, and structure of accountable care systems will need to be tailored to local 
circumstances. The promise of higher quality, better patient outcomes, and enhanced 
efficiency needs to be weighed against the prospect of greater consolidation that can lead to 
higher prices or less responsiveness to patient preferences. Yet, applying coordinated 
payment reforms not only to Medicare but also to Medicaid and private insurance plans is 
likely to be the key to broad dissemination of reforms throughout the health system. As 
experience is gained, learning quickly and continuously about the factors that lead to 
success and understanding the problems and pitfalls that need to be addressed will be 
critical to putting lessons into practice and achieving the success, sustainability, and rapid 
spread of ACOs. This is of paramount importance given the urgency arising out of the 
current health care system’s shortcomings. 
 
PROMISING ORGANIZATIONAL AND PAYMENT MODELS 
The ACO concept of care delivery holds significant potential for transforming the U.S. 
health care system, particularly when it is combined with complementary models like 
patient-centered medical homes. Work by the Commission has shown that encouraging 
the spread of more organized systems through the use of financial incentives, changes to 
the regulatory, professional, and educational context, and support for new infrastructure 
will help lower health care costs.10 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated 
that providing ACOs with the incentive of shared savings would save Medicare $4.9 
billion over the 10-year period ending in 2019.11
 
 However, several factors indicate that 
the eventual impact of the program will be greater than that: first, the program will not 
begin until 2012; second, the CBO estimate does not attribute any savings to the program 
until 2013; and third, CBO’s estimate indicates that by 2019, the last year of CBO’s 10-
year budget period, program savings will have increased to $1.1 billion annually. 
In recognition of this potential, the Affordable Care Act provides incentives under the 
Medicare program for provider organizations to be accountable for the total care of 
patients, including population health outcomes, patient care experiences, and the cost per 
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person. The law specifies that an ACO is a legally established provider organization that 
directly provides many of the services covered by the Medicare program, and ensures 
access for its patients to those covered services it does not directly provide. It differs from 
managed care plans that do not provide care directly, but rather serve as insurers that 
contract with networks of providers. 
 
Provider participation in ACOs is voluntary. An ACO is required to have sufficient 
primary care providers to care for Medicare beneficiaries, but the nature or capabilities of 
the primary care providers are not defined by the law The ACO is held accountable for 
the quality and cost of care provided to the fee-for-service Medicare patients of those 
primary care physicians. The law sets out several models of ACOs (networks of 
individual practices, group practices, and hospitals partnering with physicians or 
employing physicians), and gives the HHS secretary further discretion to approve other 
groups of providers. 
 
Although the ACOs established under the law are specifically for Medicare fee-for-
service beneficiaries and must legally be organizations of providers, there is nothing to 
preclude a commercial insurer from setting up an organization of participating providers 
or from developing contractual relationships with the same organization of participating 
providers for the care of commercially-insured patients or Medicare Advantage patients. 
Such arrangements could foster aligned payment incentives and facilitate the 
development of infrastructure support (administrative, leadership, analytic, information 
system, and care management system) for the provider organizations. 
 
The Affordable Care Act specifies that each ACO will receive a distribution of the 
savings achieved, and the proposed rule released by CMS would provide ACOs with the 
option to receive a higher share of any savings if they also agree to be liable for a share of 
any excess spending in the first two years of the program—with all ACOs required to 
both share in savings and be liable for excess spending in the third year. In addition, other 
approaches could be used as the basis for ACO payments in pilots developed and 
implemented by the Innovation Center; for example, the ACO could receive a global fee, 
with the providers taking full risk, or a partial capitation payment, which is a blend of 
fee-for-service payment and a global fee. 
 
Under either a global fee or a partial capitation approach, Medicare would have to decide 
how to pay for the services patients receive from providers outside the ACO. Medicare 
might continue to pay for those services (e.g., hospital care, home health care, or non-
ACO specialists) as it does now, adjusting the global fee or partial capitation payment to 
 10 
the ACO for “out-of-organization” care. Alternatively, the ACO might be required to 
enter into a formal agreement with and pay “out-of-organization” providers who are 
necessary to ensure accessible, coordinated care. 
 
Three promising organizational models for ACOs are illustrated in Exhibit 4 and 
elaborated in Exhibit 5. These include: advanced primary care practice networks with 
infrastructure support and associated specialist referral networks; multispecialty 
physician group practices with hospital affiliation; and health care organizations with 
functionally integrated ambulatory, inpatient, and postacute care services.12
 
 The exhibits 
also illustrate different Medicare payment methods that could be used as an alternative to 
current fee-for-service payment, with Medicare paying the ACO for the services it 
provides using these new methods of payment, while continuing to pay for “out-of-
organization” services directly as it does now, with any savings distributed to the ACO as 
an incentive for proper stewardship of the total resources required in the provision of 
care, either directly, as under a global fee; through shared savings, as in a fee-for-service 
model; or as a combination of the two, as under partial capitation. 
 
Advanced primary care 
networks
Multispecialty physician group 
practices with hospital affiliation
Integrated ambulatory, 
inpatient, and postacute care
Criteria for 
Participation
Primary care:
•24/7 access arrangements
•Chronic condition registries: at 
least basic HIT
•Teams
•Contract entity
•Primary care foundation 
•HIT link across practices
•Hospital able to accept bundled 
payment for select conditions
•Contract entity
•Primary care foundation
•HIT links across sites including 
hospital
•Legal entity to contract and take 
financial risk
Payment Mix •Blended FFS payment and 
medical home monthly fees
•Shared savings
•Medical home monthly fees for 
primary care
•Bundled acute case rates with 30-
day warranty for at least two 
conditions
•Shared savings
•Medical home monthly fee for 
primary care
•Bundled acute case rates for 
multiple conditions
•Moving toward risk-adjusted 
global fees
•Reinsurance or other methods to 
mitigate insurance risk
Tracking 
Metrics—
Targets based 
on top 10% 
and starting 
point for each 
ACO
•Patient survey
•Admissions for ambulatory care–
sensitive conditions; 30-day 
readmit rates; and emergency 
department use
•Chronic care outcomes
•Total costs of care for chronically 
ill, including Rx
•Targets for each
•Patient survey
•Admissions for ambulatory care–
sensitive conditions; 30-day 
readmit rates; and emergency 
department use
•Chronic care outcomes
•Mortality for select acute 
conditions
•Total costs of care, including Rx
•Targets for each
•Patient survey
•Admissions for ambulatory care–
sensitive conditions; 30-day 
readmit rates; and emergency 
department use
•Chronic care outcomes
•Mortality for acute conditions
•Total costs of care, including Rx 
and post-acute care
•Targets for each
Criteria to 
renew contract
•High patient ratings
•Meet quality targets
•Slow cost growth
•Reinvest savings in care system 
•High patient ratings
•Meet quality targets
•Slow cost growth
•Reinvest savings in care system 
•High patient ratings
•Meet quality targets
•Slow cost growth
•Reinvest savings in care system
Exhibit 5. Some Promising Organizational Models for ACOs
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Alternative payment methods that could be used for ACOs include: 
 
• Primary care medical home fees, such as those paid by Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Michigan (BCBS-MI) and Community Care of North Carolina (CCNC); 
• Bundled acute case rates, such as those used by the Geisinger Health System 
(Geisinger) in Pennsylvania; and 
• Global fees, including those employed by HealthPartners in Minnesota 
(HealthPartners), Intermountain Healthcare (Intermountain) in Utah, Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS-MA), and Kaiser Permanente in eight regions around 
the country. 
 
Additional variants of each model of organization and payment could be developed, but 
any payment model used should ensure that ACOs are held accountable for the overall 
quality and total costs of care provided to their assigned patient population. Below is an 
examination of several basic payment approaches, including those listed above, in the 
context of alternative organizational models. 
 
Primary Care Medical Home Fees 
Advanced primary care practices that build on the concept of a patient-centered medical 
home could be paid a per-patient fee for all primary care or a blended payment that is part 
fee-for-service and part per-patient fee. These fees would compensate primary care 
practices for providing timely access to care, including after-hours appointments, 
managing chronic conditions, and coordinating care. They would also support practices 
in the use of care teams, telephone and e-mail exchanges, registries and active patient 
panel management, and other enhanced clinical and patient information systems. Risk-
adjustment may be required to account for additional time providers must devote to 
more-complex patients, to avoid punishing providers who treat those patients. The 
medical home is attracting interest from primary care providers, who are drawn to its 
team approach, and patients, who appreciate the benefits of medical homes, including 
prompt attention to medical issues as they arise, continuity of care, and additional support 
in managing chronic conditions. 
 
Health systems like Group Health Cooperative in Seattle have found that the medical 
home model has many advantages. Primary care physicians using a team approach that 
involves nurses and medical assistants are encouraged to care for patients in new ways. 
This includes longer visits for sicker patients; phone and e-mail access; and support of 
patients in their homes for complex medication, nutritional, or counseling needs to 
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manage conditions and avoid complications. As a result, physician burnout has gone 
down, costs have declined, and patient satisfaction has increased as the medical home 
saves patients time and increases the attention and assistance they get from the entire team.13
 
 
BCBS-MI, in cooperation with the Michigan State Medical Society, has implemented a 
physician group incentive program (PGIP) to encourage adoption of the patient-centered 
medical home model. It has redirected a meaningful proportion of professional payment 
toward practice transformation and population-level performance. Over 8,600 physicians, 
including 5,600 primary care physicians, have developed associations with 39 physician 
organizations serving 2 million BCBS-MI members. Incentive payments to these 
physician organizations amount to approximately $100 million a year, rewarding 
infrastructure development, including electronic health information systems and care 
process transformation, improvement and optimization of population level quality and 
cost performance, the implementation of provider-delivered disease management 
services, and clinical process reengineering support. In addition, primary care practices 
that implement a critical mass of medical home capabilities and have good outcomes on 
cost and quality measures receive increased fee-for-service payments for office-based, 
cognitive services, further supporting the model of comprehensive care provided by a 
physician-led medical home team. A Commonwealth Fund-supported evaluation of the 
PGIP by the University of Michigan is forthcoming.14
 
 
Another ACO model might involve state-created umbrella organizations providing 
support to independent physician practices. An example is CCNC, a public–private 
partnership between the state and 15 nonprofit community care networks to enable 
practices serving low-income adults and children enrolled in Medicaid and the Children's 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) to function as medical homes for their patients. 
Evaluations have found a 40 percent decrease in hospitalizations for asthma, a 16 percent 
decrease in emergency room use, and total savings to the Medicaid and CHIP programs 
of $535 million.15 The payment model has a simple structure: each of the networks 
receives a payment of $3.00 per member per month from the state’s Medicaid program as 
an “enhanced care management fee.” These fees are to be used to hire local case 
managers and pay for the resources necessary to manage Medicaid enrollees in the 
participating practices. Similarly, primary care physicians enrolled in the program receive 
an “enhanced case management fee” from Medicaid of $2.50 per member per month, 
which helps ensure their participation in the network and its care management 
programs.16 CCNC is currently engaged in disseminating information about the model to 
encourage replication in other states, and several states have expressed interest.17 
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Oklahoma recently received approval from CMS to test the model in up to two areas; and 
if successful, the model will be implemented statewide. Alabama is also seeking CMS’s 
approval for replication of the Community Care model. 
 
Other successful examples of enhancing patient-centered medical homes include new 
ways of working with specialists as consultants to primary care clinicians,18 as well as 
developing referral networks in which there are specific service agreements for care 
coordination between primary care and specialty practices that specify the way services 
are delivered and integrated.19
 
 
Emerging evidence about several medical home projects attests to improved care results 
and reduced emergency department use, hospital admissions, and avoidable 
complications.20 Several of the models include medical homes in more integrated care 
systems, such as Geisinger21 and Intermountain.22
 
 
Although a medical home can exist independently of an ACO, there is enormous benefit 
to combining the two organizational concepts. A variety of support services provided 
through a medical home (e.g., care coordination, after-hours care, and health information 
exchange) are necessary for the primary care practice to be able to achieve significant 
results with respect to the quality and cost of care for the population served. The ACO 
can be thought of as providing a “medical neighborhood” that not only provides or 
arranges for the provision of those services, but also assures clinical integration between 
primary care practices that may share responsibility for managing patients (including 
after-hours coverage) and among primary care practices, specialists, hospitals, home 
health care, long-term care, and other settings of care. With either a blended fee-for-
service payment and medical home fee or a global primary care fee, it should be possible 
for the primary care practice to supply or purchase enhanced services or enable networks 
of primary care practices to develop or collectively purchase shared services and become 
an ACO. Ideally, all of the primary care practices in an ACO would meet criteria for 
being medical homes for their patients. 
 
Bundled Acute Case Rates 
Another approach is to pay a bundled acute case rate to hospitals for a given procedure, 
such as hip replacement or heart bypass surgery, that includes care after discharge. 
Everything is included in one fee: the hospital bill (and any care necessitated by 
complications that cause the patient to be readmitted to the hospital), the surgeon’s fee, 
the anesthesiologist’s fee, the rehabilitation facility fee, and the fees for the many other 
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providers that are typically involved in complex procedures and the subsequent period of 
recovery. Geisinger offers such a bundled fee for a number of procedures, including 
coronary artery bypass graft surgery, total hip replacement, and perinatal care. 
 
A bundled acute case rate for a surgical, medical, or obstetrical procedure has many 
advantages. The most important is that it provides a significant incentive to hospitals, 
surgeons, and other hospital-based physicians to take joint responsibility for reducing 
complications and improving transitions in care after discharge. This, in turn, should 
stimulate providers to collaborate to organize care in a way that leads to excellent 
outcomes and eliminates waste and excess cost. Bundled payment also allows providers 
the flexibility to provide services that are not generally covered by health insurance but 
may improve outcomes and reduce costs; these include medical services such as remote 
diagnosis and nonmedical services such as nutrition or home-based help. The bundled-
payment approach also encourages providers to use their time more efficiently and in a 
way that may be more convenient for their patients.23
 
 
Global Fees 
The current fee-for-service payment system rewards physicians for providing a greater 
volume of more costly services rather than for getting the best results for patients. While 
bundled case rates may partially address this issue, they create new issues such as how 
best to define the bundle and how to keep the number of bundles from growing in 
response to the payment incentive. An alternative is to pay each provider organization a 
global fee for all care—a fixed, per-person payment based on the patient’s health 
condition or a risk-adjusted capitation rate—and allow the provider organization the 
latitude of determining the care processes that are most appropriate for the population  
it serves. 
 
Very successful examples of global payments exist. In the case of integrated delivery 
systems with their own health insurance plans, like HealthPartners, Intermountain, and 
Kaiser Permanente, patients enroll in the insurance plan and get their care through that 
health system of hospitals and physicians. The health system is effectively paid a global 
fee per patient, with some cost-sharing payments by patients for individual services. But 
if it manages patients’ diabetes well so that those patients aren’t hospitalized, or it begins 
using lower-cost imaging tests, those savings remain with the organization and can be 
reinvested in improved care or distributed to the health care providers who can then share 
in the savings.24
 
 Patients benefit from better outcomes and by avoiding hospitalization or 
unnecessary tests, and may also share in the savings in the form of lower premiums. 
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BCBS-MA has piloted a monthly, risk-adjusted global payment that covers all services 
delivered for members of its health maintenance organization (HMO) plan. The levels of 
shared savings in this Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) are contingent on quality 
improvements, including improved outcomes. Nine organizations now participate in 
these alternative quality contracts, including one-fourth of all primary care physicians in 
the BCBS-MA network and 13 affiliated hospitals, serving 31 percent of BCBS-MA’s 
1.2 million HMO members. A Commonwealth Fund-supported evaluation of the AQC by 
Harvard University is in progress.25
 
 
When global fees are being considered—particularly those that cover a significant 
amount of care that isn’t within the direct control of the providers who constitute the 
ACO entity—there needs to be consideration of whether the providers are being asked to 
take on an appropriate level of risk. There are two categories of financial risk associated 
with health care delivery: “probability (or insurance) risk” and “technical risk.”26
 
 The 
former is the risk that some members of the population will develop unusually expensive 
problems or that some providers will systematically attract higher-cost patients, whereas 
the latter results from the provider’s delivery of inappropriate care or inappropriately 
expensive care that overuses or wastes resources. Insurance risk can be mitigated for the 
provider; in contrast, it is appropriate that the provider be held responsible for delivering 
technically effective and efficient care. 
ACOs receiving global fees or partial capitation could experience savings or losses. When 
the ACO provides care to the population for which it receives global payments for less 
cost than the total payment received, it captures the savings. Alternatively, if it spends 
more than what it receives, it is at risk for the loss. The risk to the ACO of being accountable 
for high-cost patients (insurance risk) ought to be mitigated through risk-adjusted global 
payments and/or reinsurance or stop-loss provisions. Risk-adjusted payments would be 
provided directly by Medicare and other payers, while reinsurance and/or stop-loss 
protection could be either provided by payers or obtained by the ACO from a private 
reinsurer to which it pays premiums. Minimizing “technical risk” will be an important 
core function of ACOs, one that will require them to develop systems and processes to 
help their constituent providers manage care as effectively and efficiently as possible. 
 
Overall, global payment arrangements are likely to be more appealing to, and better 
managed by, more functionally integrated care systems with an existing legal structure 
and financial structure to allocate resources across a continuum of care. Loosely 
integrated confederations of independent practices that are just in the process of 
developing ways to work together and share information across sites of care are less 
 16 
Integrated Delivery Systems
Everett, WA – Everett Clinic
Marshfield, WI – Marshfield 
Clinic
Springfield, MO – St Johns Health System 
Danville, PA – Geisinger Health System
Billings, MT – Billings Clinic
St. Louis Park, MN – Park Nicollet Health 
Services
Winston-Salem, NC – Forsyth Medical Group
Physician Groups Academic Centers
Ann Arbor, MI – University of 
Michigan Faculty Group Practice
Bedford, NH – Dartmouth–
Hitchcock Clinic
Exhibit 6. Physician Group Practice Demonstration Sites
Source: Adapted from “Toward Accountable Care,” Presentation by Nicholas Wolter at Alliance for Health Reform Hill Briefing 
on Pathways to Payment Innovation in a Post-Reform Era, May 10, 2010.
Physician Networks
Middletown, CT – Middlesex 
Health System
likely to welcome such payment arrangements. However, offering attractive global 
payment models could be instrumental in encouraging emerging networks to develop 
more sophisticated organizations and care delivery systems, which offer increasingly 
integrated and coordinated care to the populations they serve. 
 
Shared Savings 
Launched in 2005, the Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP) demonstration gave 10 
large, multispecialty group practices the opportunity to share savings earned by reducing 
the cost of health care delivered to the Medicare beneficiaries they treat—contingent on 
their ability to meet a set of quality improvement standards. The demonstration, the 
experience with which guided policymakers as they wrote the health reform law, offered 
each participating practice a portion of the savings it achieved relative to a target based 
on the local trend in per-beneficiary cost in the area it serves. The participating practices, 
distributed across the country, were chosen for their capacity to engage in system 
redesign (Exhibit 6). These practices encompass different organizational models: two are 
physician groups that have no formal affiliation with a hospital, five are integrated 
delivery systems, two are practices affiliated with an academic medical center, and one is 
a physician network. 
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While the payment model involved no downside risk to the practices in terms of 
payment, the participating practices were expected to spend their own resources up front 
in efforts to achieve savings. For each practice in each year, excess spending from prior 
years was accrued in determining if there were savings to be shared. Nonetheless, the 
prospect of shared savings provided what appears to have been an effective impetus to 
engage in practice improvement to increase quality and slow cost growth. 
 
All 10 PGP practices achieved benchmark performance on almost all of the agreed-upon 
quality measures over the first four years of the demonstration, and in the third and fourth 
years, five practices received bonus payments by reducing by two percentage points or 
more the trend in Medicare outlays relative to the overall trend in the areas they serve.27 
Strategies for improving performance varied across sites—ranging from interventions 
focused on selected chronic conditions such as diabetes and heart failure to nurse case 
managers for patients at high risk of emergency department use, hospitalization, and 
rehospitalization.28
 
 
The payment method that CMS has proposed for the Medicare Shared Savings Program 
differs in several ways from the one used in the PGP demonstration. One major 
difference is that it provides ACOs with the option to reap a more substantial share of 
possible savings than in the PGP demonstration if they also agree to receive lower 
payments if their costs exceed their target rates; by the third year, all ACOs will be 
required to participate in a two-sided model. Another difference is that the ACO’s 
spending target will be based on the historical national rate of increase, rather than the 
rate of increase actually experienced in the organization’s own service area. An important 
similarity to the PGP demonstration, however, is that a large share of the distribution of 
shared savings would be based on the organization’s performance on a set of specified 
quality performance standards. 
 
A Diversity of Organizational Models Fit Within the ACO Concept 
Although functional integration is likely to be easier to achieve when a single organizational 
entity owns and operates an entire health care delivery system, encompassing ambulatory 
primary and specialty care, hospital care, ancillary services, and possibly long-term care, 
as well as an insurance mechanism, it can also be achieved by tight contractual 
arrangements between separately owned components, or even a set of highly aligned 
incentives that catalyze the development of shared information systems and care 
processes and permit a full spectrum of accountable care for a defined population. A 
Commonwealth Fund series of 15 case studies has shown how diverse types of organized 
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health care delivery systems promote higher performance through attributes such as 
information continuity, patient engagement, care coordination, team-oriented care 
delivery, continuous innovation and learning, and convenient access to care.29
 
 
Developing these attributes ought to become objectives for the various models of ACO. 
When an organization has these attributes, it should be capable of providing 
demonstrable benefits to both patients and providers such as achieving the Triple Aim. 
Furthermore, using modern technology and shared services, it should be possible to 
achieve these results without necessarily requiring physicians to aggregate physically 
under one roof, allaying both the public’s and physicians’ concerns about large 
institutional practices. 
For example, medical homes are compatible with any of the basic organizational models 
shown in Exhibit 4. Primary care practices could be organized in networks affiliated with 
a specialist referral network and an infrastructure support of shared services; organized as 
part of a multispecialty group practice; or organized as part of an integrated delivery 
system with a full continuum of care services. Geisinger, which both owns and has 
affiliations with sets of primary care practices, supplied care coordinators to both owned 
and affiliated practices as part of the PGP demonstration. 
 
By exploring diverse models, the most effective strategies can be identified before 
communities, payers, and governments commit to one or more of them. An approach that 
fosters diversity in how ACOs are constituted and organized will allow them to be 
responsive to local cultures and circumstances. It will also be more likely to avoid the 
potential negative consequence of consolidation of providers into large, vertically 
integrated systems, which dominate their markets and are inclined to use their market 
dominance to undermine incentives that would otherwise drive them toward increased 
efficiency. Finally, by allowing and fostering the development of diverse ACO models, 
providers (physicians, hospitals, and community-based programs) will be supported  
in being fully engaged in their practices and will be animated by the values, purposes,  
and sense of ownership that inspire them in their professional work and service to  
the community. 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
For ACOs to contribute significantly to improving the performance of the U.S. health 
system, it will be essential for the accountable care model to become widespread and able to 
operate in and adapt to a wide variety of local populations and health care environments. 
To provide a solid basis for the propagation of the model, it is important to build on 
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successful innovations already under way across the country, including those used at 
Medicare PGP demonstration sites, and ACO and medical home initiatives launched by 
state governments, private insurers, and providers.30
 
 
The Commission on a High Performance Health System offers here a series of 
recommendations intended primarily to inform CMS in the development of final rules for 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program but also to assist the Innovation Center as it 
considers alternative payment approaches and models of health care delivery. These 
considerations are, moreover, important for all parties—payers, providers, patients, and 
purchasers—interested in improving the performance of the U.S. health system through 
this approach. These recommendations are intended to describe a set of design features 
that are important to ensure that ACOs achieve the goals of health reform—the Triple 
Aim of better care, better health, and lower costs—while allowing enough flexibility to 
achieve success in different health care environments with various populations and 
configurations of providers and payers. 
 
Strong Primary Care Foundation 
ACOs are specifically defined by the Affordable Care Act to be “an organization of 
health care providers that agrees to be accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care 
of [the fee-for-service] Medicare beneficiaries . . . who are assigned to it.”31
 
 
The statutory requirements for ACOs include having enough primary care providers to 
serve the Medicare beneficiaries in the group. This requirement reflects the fact that the 
goal is to improve access and coordinate care, with an emphasis on prevention and health. 
A strong primary care foundation is essential for accessible, well-coordinated care, 
especially for beneficiaries with chronic conditions, and is characteristic of high-
performing health systems—ones that achieve better outcomes, lower costs, and greater 
equity in serving a population.32
 
 These results depend upon robustness of each of the 
dimensions of primary care: first contact, continuity, coordination, and 
comprehensiveness. Primary care practices should provide excellence in primary and 
secondary prevention; screening and early detection of illness; coordinated acute care with 
appropriate follow-up; and smooth transitions across clinicians, settings, and services. 
Belief that the United States will benefit from more and better primary care services has 
led to the development of the patient-centered medical home. This model emphasizes 
patient-centered primary care that is available day and night and is the core of a system 
that delivers evidence-based, coordinated care. While 95 percent of American adults say 
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they would like a practice that is accessible and provides personal, coordinated care, only 
50 percent can say they have all four of the following: 1) a regular doctor or place of care 
(90 percent); 2) the doctor or staff who knows important information about their history 
(82 percent—“always” or “often”); 3) a doctor who is easy to contact by phone during 
regular office hours (81 percent—“easy” or “somewhat easy”); and a doctor who helps 
coordinate care received from other doctors or sources of care (69 percent—“always” or 
“often”).33
 
 People who give an affirmative answer to all four of those questions tend to 
experience fewer errors in care or medication, less duplication of tests and delays in care, 
better chronic care management, and greater overall satisfaction with care. 
There is reason to believe—and early evidence to indicate—that primary care practices, 
even ones that have adopted electronic medical records and several other important 
features, will best meet patient needs when they are an integral part of a supportive health 
care system with payment methods that encourage and reward working together to care 
for patients over time.34 While medical homes are necessary, they will function best in 
medical neighborhoods that enhance clinical integration across physician practices 
(primary care and specialists) and between health care facilities that focus on effective 
and efficient care and improved outcomes.35 ACOs should be able to provide these 
medical neighborhoods. Therefore, medical homes and ACOs should be complementary 
models of care delivery.36
 
 
The support that ACOs can provide would logically encompass or link all of the 
practices, primary care and specialty, and organizations such as hospitals that are 
providing services to a population of patients for which they are responsible. For 
example, they could provide or contract for after-hours care (e.g., telephone triage and 
centralized urgent care visits) to provide round-the-clock access. They could provide the 
equivalent of an “information technology department” for practices that could not 
otherwise support one and ensure that there is information exchange between providers. 
They could supply a variety of care coordination and disease management services to 
affiliated hospitals and practices. They could develop or contract with an information 
exchange to connect the organizational components. And they can—indeed, will be 
required to—provide a variety of administrative and analytic services that assemble 
performance information. This same set of capabilities also should facilitate the ACO’s 
offering, and perhaps require specific performance improvement activities such as 
regional improvement collaboratives or expertise in change management facilitation. 
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Recommendation 1. Strong Primary Care Foundation 
1a. CMS should ensure that all ACOs have a strong primary care foundation that 
builds on the concept of the patient-centered medical home. 
1b. Although CMS may require that ACOs have certain structural characteristics (e.g., 
electronic medical records and availability of after-hours care) or have certain 
processes in place (e.g., quality improvement programs), the availability and 
accessibility to patients of a regular source of care and the ability of that provider to 
coordinate care received from all sources should be paramount. 
 
Accountability for Quality of Care, Patient Care Experiences, Population Outcomes, 
and Total Costs 
To stimulate the spread of patient-centered care systems that provide timely access to 
well-coordinated care and strive for continual improvement in outcomes, it will be 
important to ensure accountability for health care quality, patient experiences, and 
positive outcomes in addition to reduced costs—and to reward those results. ACOs will 
be held accountable for, and their payments will be tied to, meeting performance 
standards. For example, patient surveys will assess access and care experiences, and 
outcome and quality indicators will track and assess performance over time. 
 
To gain public trust and to stimulate innovations that improve patient care, it is essential 
to link ACO accountability to a commitment to track and report performance. Such 
accountability was notably absent when the managed care movement was growing in the 
1990s, giving rise to concerns that financial incentives were undermining rather than 
enhancing quality of care.37 As illustrated in Exhibit 5, outcome metrics could vary 
depending on the level of integration and bundling of payments. All types of ACOs, 
however, would benefit from targeted surveys to obtain the patient perspective on access 
and care outcomes—including health and functional improvement after surgery. Within 
the United States and internationally, patient registries that are used to guide systematic 
outreach and follow-up, and to report on these activities, can also provide feedback to 
clinicians to help them improve care.38
 
 Holding emerging ACOs accountable for costs, 
quality of care, outcomes, and patient experiences has the potential to stimulate ongoing 
health system change focused on achieving better care at lower costs—and supported by 
the public. 
It is axiomatic that ACOs should be accountable for achieving the Triple Aim. The 
question is: to whom are ACOs accountable? The answer is they must be accountable to 
multiple parties, including the population they serve, their payers, and the providers with 
whom they have regular relationships. In turn, it is particularly important that the 
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providers within each ACO understand their attendant responsibilities, which are broader 
than under the current delivery system and payment structure. For example, hospitals 
traditionally identify their population as persons to whom they are providing services. As 
a component of an ACO, it will be important for hospitals to understand that their 
contribution to accountability for patient experiences and outcomes extends into areas 
such as working with others to ensure excellent follow-up care and reduce or eliminate 
avoidable readmissions, helping other providers reduce or eliminate ambulatory care–
sensitive admissions, and providing excellent experiences for patients and their family 
members, who may also be part of an ACO population even if they are not patients of the 
hospital themselves. 
 
Recommendation 2. Accountability for Quality of Care, Patient Care Experiences, 
Population Outcomes, and Total Costs 
2a. All participating ACOs should be required to agree to and be able to report 
measures of quality of care, patient care experiences, and outcomes, or have 
arrangements in place to enable such reporting. 
2b. Shared savings should be distributed contingent on high quality and positive 
patient experiences. 
2c. CMS (along with other participating payers) should work with each ACO to ensure 
that incentives for providers within the ACO are aligned and consistent with the 
aims of better health, better care, and lower costs. 
2d. Regardless of which payers are involved in the ACO payment mechanism, the 
shared savings paid out by each payer or group of payers should, to the extent 
feasible, take into account the ability of the ACO to achieve overall savings on total 
costs, rather than just savings for individual payers. 
 
Informed and Engaged Patients 
Having physicians discuss with the patient the fact that the physician is part of an ACO 
and what that means about the kind of care the patient will be receiving can increase the 
levels of engagement of both providers and patients, enhance provider–patient 
relationships, and enable more coordinated care. It also would be to the advantage of all 
the parties involved to be able to: 1) assure patients that the physician and the 
organization of which he or she is a part are aiming to achieve a high level of 
performance; 2) explain how they plan to do so; and 3) convey what safeguards have 
been established to protect the patient’s access to the care he or she needs and ensure the 
quality and effectiveness of that care. Ideally, physicians and their patients would reach 
agreement on their mutual expectations and responsibilities. 
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In the absence of effective communication of this sort, patients may infer that the 
physicians and others caring for them have an incentive to withhold necessary care and 
not have full trust in their providers, as happened in the late 1990s with respect to 
managed care organizations. 
 
From the outset, there should be transparency about the how the ACO’s performance is 
being measured and, over time, one would expect ACOs to provide evidence to patients 
of their performance. Patients should retain the right to receive care from the specialists 
of their choice. Indeed, if patients seek care outside the ACO because they perceive they 
are not getting the access they need or quality they believe they deserve, this may 
encourage providers to improve. Care outside the ACO, however, may not be as well 
coordinated—for example, if the providers inside and outside the ACO do not share an 
information exchange or the hospital outside the ACO does not know how best to arrange 
a care transition back to the providers inside the ACO. Patients will need to be informed 
about the benefits and pitfalls of seeking care outside the ACO; and the ACO should be 
monitoring not just the occurrence of care outside the ACO but also the reasons behind it. 
That monitoring should be considered part of their overall responsibility for the population. 
 
Physicians often are concerned that their professional performance is subject to factors 
outside their control, such as whether the patient is adhering to a treatment or medication 
regimen. Yet, common reasons for nonadherence are cost and disagreement with or lack 
of understanding of a physician’s recommendations.39
 
 Medicare beneficiaries not only 
have coverage, but will have increasingly comprehensive coverage for preventive care 
and prescription drugs under the Affordable Care Act, so cost should be less of a barrier. 
That said, physicians and other providers undoubtedly need assistance in doing a better 
job engaging patients in shared decision-making and using teach-back techniques to 
ensure that their recommendations are understood and mutually acceptable. A similar set 
of issues is involved in helping patients with chronic conditions understand those 
conditions and how they can help themselves in the management of them. 
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Recommendation 3. Informed and Engaged Patients 
3a. Providers should notify all of their patients that the providers belong to a given 
ACO, along with its characteristics and what that will mean for the care that 
patients will receive. 
3b. ACOs should encourage providers and patients to specify expectations and 
responsibilities, and engage providers and patients as partners in ensuring the best 
care and outcomes. 
3c. CMS should test different approaches for encouraging patients to designate an 
ACO as the principal source of their care by providing positive incentives to do so 
(such as enhanced benefits or lower cost-sharing responsibility). Patients should 
retain the right to seek care from the providers of their choice, including those not 
participating in the ACO, unless they explicitly agree to receive care exclusively 
from the ACO’s providers. 
 
Commitment to Serving the Community 
One of the major lessons of the 1990s managed care experience was that as the HMO 
market evolved from one comprising prepaid group practices concerned primarily with 
health care delivery to one dominated by organizations in which the insurance function 
was distinct from the health care delivery function, the focus of managed care shifted 
from providing care to paying for care. This led to a patient backlash, as HMOs—
regardless of the motivations of individual organizations—increasingly were seen as 
attempting to pay lower prices and deny needed care, rather than coordinating care and 
providing it more efficiently and effectively. To safeguard against history repeating itself, 
ACOs should embrace a culture of putting the patient first, with a focus on providing 
access to the most appropriate care and a mission of serving the community. In particular, 
access to needed health care for low-income, uninsured, and other vulnerable populations 
must be ensured. 
 
Recommendation 4. Commitment to Serving the Community 
CMS should make an explicit commitment to serving their community, including low-
income and uninsured patients, an integral part of qualifying as an ACO. 
 
Criteria for Entry and Continued Participation That Emphasize Accountability  
and Performance 
The Affordable Care Act includes several compliance requirements for ACOs, and more 
specific requirements are described in CMS’s proposed rule for the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program. Meeting these requirements would best be ensured by developing clear 
entry criteria for these organizations, together with new payment arrangements. 
Continued participation should be contingent on performance. 
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Although there are a number of characteristics that may be associated with the potential 
success of the model, CMS must strike an appropriate balance between the need to ensure 
its success and the desire to be flexible enough to encourage its propagation. Some 
essential features of ACOs are specifically defined by the Affordable Care Act, 
including: 
 
• Relationships with a group of providers either through direct involvement in the 
organization or through a contractual arrangement, so that the ACO can provide the 
full continuum of health care for the population it serves. 
• An established mechanism for shared governance among those directly involved in 
the organization. 
• A leadership and management structure that includes clinical and administrative 
systems that can provide information needed to assess patient experiences, outcomes, 
and costs. Such systems are essential for providing feedback to participating 
providers and patients and for informing efforts to learn and improve and to report 
performance to payers and the public. 
• Agreement to survey patients about their access and care experiences and report 
patient outcomes. 
• The financial and administrative stability necessary to be accountable for the quality, 
costs, and overall care of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries and others in the 
population served, as well as the ability to take on a three-year contract with 
Medicare for the quality, costs, and overall care of fee-for-service beneficiaries with 
minimum risk of default on the contract. 
• An appropriate legal structure enabling the organization to receive and distribute 
payments for shared savings to the providers in the group. 
• A process for ensuring the competence of providers—for example, structured annual 
review of physician performance.40
• A set of processes that meets the requirement for promoting evidence-based medicine 
and patient engagement. 
 
• Capability of using “enabling technologies” for care coordination, such as telehealth 
and remote patient-monitoring. 
• Appropriate mechanisms for providing patient-centered care, as documented by 
patient experiences. 
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The criteria an organization must meet to participate as an ACO should focus on 
functionality, as detailed above, rather than on structures per se. ACOs will need to be 
adaptable to a variety of health care markets, which may differ in terms of location, 
degree of competition, and other characteristics. All ACOs will need to include, or 
contract with, the appropriate providers to ensure they can be accountable for care across 
the continuum and ensure access to needed care for the population they serve. Even the 
minimum entry criteria for participation must not be overly prescriptive, while at the 
same time ensuring sufficient functional capacity for the provider organization to assume 
accountability for care. 
 
It will challenge the creativity of all the major stakeholders in an ACO to determine how 
the requirements above and any others might best be met. Since participating ACOs 
would be required to report on performance metrics for quality and patient experiences 
and have arrangements with payers to report on total costs of care, it is reasonable to 
expect that continued participation in ACO payment arrangements would be contingent 
on performance on patient experiences and quality, not just costs. 
 
Measuring and reporting on outcomes should also be part of the ongoing certification 
process to assure the public that ACOs are indeed accountable to patients. Patients are 
unlikely to be convinced they are receiving more effective and efficient care unless 
performance data are publicly available. Significant effort will be required to develop 
new performance measures and make them progressively more meaningful to the public 
and providers. 
 
Recommendation 5. Criteria for Entry and Continued Participation That Emphasize 
Accountability and Performance 
Entry criteria for ACOs should include, at a minimum, the availability of primary care and 
the capacity of the organization to ensure that patients have access to needed services 
across the continuum of care, as well as the ability to provide meaningful evidence of 
quality (including patient experiences and outcomes) and cost performance. Continued 
participation and financial rewards should be contingent on performance and 
accountability, rather than structural characteristics. This should include public reporting 
of performance metrics. 
 
Multipayer Alignment to Provide Appropriate and Consistent Incentives 
Most physician practices have both Medicare patients and privately insured patients. If 
these payers have different methods of payment, the incentives that are intended in the 
law to improve quality and control costs for Medicare patients will be less effective than 
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if all payers join together and pay ACOs in compatible ways. The greater scale that 
comes from participation of private insurers will also enable ACOs to establish the 
infrastructure required for success, as well as enable them to share in risks. 
 
Fisher and colleagues calculated that one can have stable networks of care for a panel of 
5,000 Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries;41 the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission has stated that it would take 5,000 beneficiaries to make it possible to 
“distinguish actual improvement from random variation on a reasonably consistent 
basis.”42 While 5,000 Medicare patients in an ACO may meet the requirements set out in 
law, from the perspective of providers it may take a much larger degree of improvement 
from trend to generate a reasonable probability and amount of reward for that small a 
panel of patients. Thus, ACOs as entities are more likely to succeed if the majority of the 
patients cared for by their providers care are considered to be part of the ACO—and that 
is more likely to happen if multiple payers are providing consistent incentives.43
 
 
In some instances, this will involve CMS’s convening other payers to organize joint 
initiatives; in other instances, since ACO pilots are developing in some states that do not 
yet involve CMS, it will involve CMS’s joining those efforts. These approaches 
maximize the likelihood that the providers who are willing to become involved in an 
ACO that meets the statutory requirements will have similar care and cost objectives for 
the majority of patients they serve. This should not be taken to imply that Medicare, 
Medicaid, or other payers must delay their efforts to encourage the development of ACOs 
until multiple payers can be involved in the initiative, but that those efforts, where 
possible, should be coordinated to align incentives and maximize their impact. Over time, 
CMS and other payers can move toward higher degrees of coordination by using similar 
performance measures, payment models, and methods for sharing data, and by sharing 
best practices and lessons learned. 
 
Recommendation 6. Multipayer Alignment to Provide Appropriate and Consistent 
Incentives 
CMS should actively work with providers and payers in each major market to develop 
multipayer ACO arrangements—including Medicare, Medicaid, and private payers—
whenever possible. Such arrangements should be designed to align incentives among 
payers, give a clear and consistent message to ACOs, and enable them to focus on 
higher quality of care, better patient care experiences, improved population health 
outcomes, and lower costs for all their patients, as well as simplifying administrative 
processes. 
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Payment That Reinforces and Rewards High Performance 
The Affordable Care Act specifies that ACOs shall share in savings as the growth in 
Medicare Part A and Part B outlays for their patients is reduced relative to the projected 
trend in per-beneficiary spending in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. The target used 
to calculate savings is to be based on the most recently available three years of cost data, 
with the precise methodology to be determined by the HHS secretary. This is a change 
from the PGP demonstration, in which the target for each participating practice was based, 
after the fact, on the actual increase in spending for other patients in the same local area 
during each year. The revised methodology has two major advantages over that used in 
the PGP demonstration: first, because the target can be prospectively specified, ACOs 
will be able to manage to a known benchmark; second, because the target is based on 
program-wide data, large ACOs will not be adversely affected by “spillover effects” in 
their community from adoption of their own improved practices by other local organizations. 
 
Other improvements in the payment mechanism for ACOs under the shared-savings 
program are needed to ensure that the incentives provided have the desired impact. In the 
PGP demonstration, savings were only attributed to each participating practice after a 
threshold of 2 percent savings had been achieved relative to the cumulative target. From 
the perspective of CMS, the 2 percent threshold was necessary to avoid rewarding 
savings that might result from random improvement versus purposeful redesign and 
achievement of more efficient care.44
 
 A better strategy would be to set the threshold at a 
95 percent confidence threshold that reflects both the size of the ACO’s patient 
population and the consistency of its actual cost trend, which would lead to lower 
thresholds for ACOs with more predictable costs over time. 
In the PGP demonstration, there has been a substantial lag between provision of care that 
is being rewarded and the distribution of the corresponding rewards. This reflects the 
need to wait until the data for the performance period are collected to compute the level 
of spending for each practice’s service area, set the spending target, and identify the 
patients who are to be attributed to each practice so their costs can be determined. 
Maximizing the effectiveness of payment incentives for ACOs and the providers that 
compose them will require ensuring that shared savings are distributed more promptly. 
 
The attribution of patients to an ACO for calculation of rewards in a shared-savings 
model will be an issue for ACOs, for several reasons. The retrospective attribution of 
patients to providers, as described above, contributes to the delay in the distribution of 
rewards. Retrospective attribution also means that it is difficult for providers to know for 
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which patients they will be held responsible. Moreover, it hinders the ability to engage 
patients as partners with their providers in managing their care, because they do not know 
at the time whether they are being included in the accounting of the ACO’s performance. 
The latter two of these issues are also addressed in the discussion of informed and 
engaged patients above. 
 
Another issue related to the determination of ACO payments is that, from the perspective 
of participating ACOs, upfront investments often are necessary to make the changes that 
will produce savings. Making those investments has required both financial stability and 
a leap of faith that the investments will pay off. Even if methods are adopted that make 
payment of shared savings more timely, some mechanism for upfront funding (which 
could be counted against any realized savings) may enable more potential ACOs to make 
the investments necessary to participate in the program. This funding could be targeted to 
providers that face particular challenges in accessing capital or that serve certain 
(vulnerable) populations or certain (rural, low-income, or underserved) areas, by 
restricting it to those groups of providers or by offering them more favorable terms. 
 
As an alternative to upfront payments, or in combination with them, changing the basic 
provider payment method to a blended payment including monthly per-patient medical 
home fees would help motivate primary care physicians to participate in ACOs and 
enable investments in teams and information systems. Similarly, bundled global fees for 
hospital acute care, including care after discharge, can provide resources for hospitals to 
invest in transition care and foster relationships with providers in the community, while 
also helping providers assume broader accountability for care of a defined set of patients 
and helping to shift the orientation of physicians toward total population care. 
 
Holding ACOs accountable to patients requires that savings be linked to positive patient 
care experiences and outcomes, not just costs. This will require financial agreements that 
make savings allocations contingent on quality and performance, as in the PGP 
demonstration. 
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Recommendation 7. Payment That Reinforces and Rewards High Performance 
7a. The threshold for attributing savings to ACOs should be set to reflect the 
predictability and reliability of each organization’s cost trend, and protect against 
shared-savings payments that are generated by random fluctuations in year-to-
year costs, while ensuring that organizations are rewarded for achieving actual 
cost reductions. 
7b. The determination and payment of shared savings should be made with as little 
delay as possible, so that the reward for reducing costs while improving quality 
closely follows the actions that generate it. This can be supported by prospectively 
determining the patients whose costs are to be used to calculate shared savings 
and prospectively setting the spending target for each ACO. 
7c. CMS (along with other participating payers) should make upfront support, possibly 
as low-cost loans against future shared savings, available to organizations that, 
because of certain circumstances, need it to offset the infrastructure investment 
expense required to redesign care processes and make other changes so they can 
become successful ACOs. Determination of the availability and extent of upfront 
support and the basis on which it is provided (e.g., loans vs. grants) may differ by 
whether it is a safety-net institution serving underserved populations, as well as by 
other defining characteristics of the organization, subject to the organization’s 
potential for achieving the program’s goals and its proposed plan for doing so. 
 
Innovative Payment Methods and Organizational Models 
Although the Affordable Care Act requires the development of a shared-savings model in 
relation to ACOs, the responsibility for testing innovative payment and delivery system 
models has been assigned to CMS’s Innovation Center, which “is to test innovative 
payment and delivery system models that show important promise for maintaining or 
improving the quality of care in Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP), while slowing the rate of program costs.”45
 
 As described earlier, this 
should encourage voluntary participation in pilots of other payment models for ACOs 
besides shared savings. 
Shortell and colleagues have proposed a three-tiered approach to paying ACOs, with 
qualifying conditions for each.46 Tier 1 involves a shared-savings model with fee-for-
service payments that could include primary care medical home fees with opportunities 
for bonuses and no downside risk. Tier 2 involves shared savings with the potential for 
more generous payments than in Tier 1, but it also adds a downside risk, with reduced 
payments if spending exceeds a preestablished target. Tier 3 would reimburse the ACOs 
through full capitation or extensive partial capitation and bundled payments; the 
opportunity for reward—as well as the risk—would be greater than in the second tier. 
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McClellan and colleagues also have proposed a three-level approach to classifying and 
paying ACOs.47
 
 In their proposal, Levels 1 and 2 are similar to Shortell and colleagues’ 
Tiers 1 and 2, but their Level 3 involves risk-adjusted partial capitation payments with 
quality bonuses rather than full capitation. In this report, we have described a set of 
organizational models as well as a set of alternative payment approaches, and discussed 
how those combinations can be combined; all of these approaches should be among those 
considered for possible pilot-testing. 
CMS is proposing to move more rapidly to a two-sided model of accountability by 
offering ACOs the option of taking responsibility for a share of any excess spending as 
well as receiving a share of savings, with a higher share of savings available for those 
who choose this arrangement. By year 3, all ACOs will be required to participate in this 
type of arrangement. 
 
Some of the questions that merit consideration in designing and evaluating various 
payment models are: 
 
• Will the addition of downside risk to shared-savings models (i.e., using the Shortell or 
McClellan frameworks, this would require comparing results of Tier/Level 2 and 
Tier/Level 1) improve performance or simply deter participation? 
• What advantages, if any, does partial capitation offer over full capitation, and does 
the answer depend on the configuration, size, and other features of the organization? 
• Will different types of organizations involving physicians (i.e., primary care network-
based, multispecialty group practice-based, or fully integrated ambulatory and hospital 
provider-based ACOs) gravitate to or only succeed with certain payment models? 
• Ultimately, how can ACOs be motivated to take on or move to the model/level/tier 
that is associated with the highest achievable levels of quality and lowest achievable 
levels of cost? 
 
Another way to consider payment models for ACOs is that they are all based on some 
degree of shared savings with some including elements of shared risk; and they can be 
designed to provide a range of opportunities for risk or reward for the ACO. That said, 
the way payments are distributed can differ greatly in various models. Shared savings 
models generally involve continued fee-for-service payments to individual practitioners 
or hospitals (perhaps evolving to a model involving symmetric risk or partial capitation), 
with the potential of a lump-sum reward to the ACO, which could distribute the reward 
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(and, perhaps, total payments) to providers under a mechanism that would be specified to 
CMS by the organization. Capitation models generally involve payment of a lump sum to 
the ACO to cover expected per-person, per-month spending, with the ACO distributing 
those funds to providers as agreed upon internally within the organization. 
 
Robinow has examined many of the issues involved in global payment or capitation in a 
series of structured interviews with experts who have substantial and lengthy experience 
with these models.48
 
 She found that tools that now exist can be used to address some past 
problems with this method of payment: for example, risk adjustment can help reduce the 
incentive for providers to avoid sicker patients, which was a major criticism of capitation 
in the heyday of managed care in the 1990s. Utilizing stop-loss or reinsurance for ACOs 
could also help mitigate insurance risk that would otherwise limit widespread provider 
participation. But other issues remain: for example, combining deductibles and 
coinsurance with global payment models requires claim adjudication and collection of the 
patient’s share of cost, which increases administrative burden. Also, although the experts 
Robinow interviewed generally favored alternatives to fee-for-service such as salary or 
payment based on panel size and performance on quality and patient satisfaction, they 
note that, for physicians in independent practices, payment based on the services they 
provide, coupled with a bonus or higher fee levels based on individual and organizational 
performance, can have desirable effects. 
Recommendation 8. Innovative Payment Methods and Organizational Models 
CMS should be prepared to apply different payment models that are suitable for different 
configurations of ACOs in different geographic areas and different circumstances, as 
appropriate. These payment approaches could include primary care medical home fees 
or bundled acute case rates, along with shared savings, or risk-adjusted global fees with 
risk mitigation (e.g., stop-loss or reinsurance). All approaches should make payments 
contingent on reaching quality benchmarks. 
 
Balanced Physician Compensation Incentives 
While the ACO as an organization will share in savings generated by improved care and 
more efficient operation, the lessons of the managed care experience of the 1990s suggest 
that applying those incentives to individual physicians or small groups of physicians 
could expose them to financial instability and pressure to under-provide services. 
 
In addition to aligning incentives for providers with the objectives of the organization and 
the health system, it is important that ACOs avoid entering into arrangements in which 
individual physicians have strong incentives to skimp on care or avoid sicker patients. 
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Collective rewards should be used to foster collective accountability for performance and 
be explainable to individual patients as minimizing the conflict a physician will have in 
making clinical decisions relating to the care of individual patients. Furthermore, 
requiring that the ACO meet performance standards based on quality before it is eligible 
for rewards based on cost also lessens the risk of skimping on necessary care for patients. 
Tying shared-savings payments to performance on quality improvement metrics, which 
was an important feature of the PGP demonstration, could strengthen the connection 
between the incentives to improve quality and reduce costs. In any case, the quality 
standards applied to ACOs must be based on or strongly related to better clinical 
outcomes and must be meaningful to patients in terms of both their outcomes and 
experiences with care. 
 
Recommendation 9. Balanced Physician Compensation Incentives 
For ACOs receiving payment for direct care as well as shared savings, compensation of 
clinicians within the ACO should include incentives to deliver evidence-based care but 
ensure that appropriate care is not withheld. 
 
Timely Monitoring, Data Feedback, and Technical Support for Improvement 
While the Affordable Care Act sets out requirements for organizations to qualify as 
ACOs, it is largely silent on what ACOs should or could do to achieve the goals of 
improved patient care, health outcomes, and greater efficiency. It does refer to the use of 
“a set of processes to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement, to 
report on quality and cost measures, and to coordinate care, such as through the use of 
telehealth, remote patient monitoring and other enabling technologies; the use of patient 
and caregiver assessments or individualized care plans among other tools, to make and 
document patient-centeredness as a focus; and the obligation to submit data to the 
Secretary of HHS on quality measures and other reporting measures . . . to assess the 
quality of care provided . . . as well as transitions across health care settings.” 
 
CMS (and other payers) could enhance the success of ACOs by providing rapid and 
comparative performance feedback. This feedback could include monthly reports on 
utilization and expenditures of patient panels, as well as comparative data from Medicare, 
Medicaid, and private insurers on provider-reported quality performance. HHS and the 
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) could also 
provide technical assistance on implementation of electronic information systems and 
exchanges. In fact, HHS and ONC currently have many technical assistance initiatives 
that CMS could build upon for ACO purposes. 
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In addition to helping ACOs operate more effectively and efficiently, timely monitoring 
could help enhance the evidence base on best clinical practice and effective organization. 
Despite enormous investments in scientific evidence and impressive results, the evidence 
base that can be applied to clinical practice to improve effective and efficient care is quite 
thin. ACOs could help in extending that evidence base, and the patients attributed to them 
need to play an important role. The central goal of a health care system is to help the 
population live longer, healthier, more productive lives. To gain better evidence about the 
effects of treatments on various subgroups of patients, it will be important to combine 
information obtained directly from patients with clinical data. And it will be important to 
develop the capability of analyzing these combined clinical databases to extract the evidence. 
 
Further, CMS and the Quality Improvement Organizations with which it has a 
relationship could create toolkits of effective interventions and best practices that health 
care organizations have found effective in improving quality and lowering cost. At a 
minimum, this should include those strategies and best practices employed by successful 
participants in earlier demonstrations, such as tools to facilitate and/or use the following: 
 
• Shared decision-making; 
• Electronic decision-support systems including disease registries, reminders, and 
prompts; 
• Electronic health information exchange; 
• After-hours services; 
• Telemonitoring and other remote monitoring systems; 
• Care coordinators, individualized care plans, and ways of managing transitions from 
inpatient to ambulatory or long-term care; 
• Patient and caregiver assessments; 
• Advance directives; 
• Predictive hospital readmission risk modeling and tailored interventions; and 
• Management of extremely complex patients, including home visits. 
 
Although financial incentives are very powerful, they are not enough by themselves to 
ensure the success of ACOs and should be supplemented by technical assistance to 
achieve the program’s aims. 
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In past demonstrations, CMS has taken a hands-off approach to implementation, for fear 
of contaminating the evaluation of the initiative. The ACO program, however, is not a 
research project. It is a permanent part of the Medicare program, and all stakeholders 
should work together to support its success. CMS should take an active role in assisting 
ACOs to develop and implement effective strategies and best practices. 
 
Recommendation 10. Timely Monitoring, Data Feedback, and Technical Support 
for Improvement 
10a. CMS should provide baseline data as well as early and regular reports on total 
Medicare payments, utilization and quality measures for the ACO patient 
population, and other data required to help ACOs be successful in achieving the 
aims of better health, better care, and lower costs; other payers should do the 
same. Trends should be tracked over time to assess the impact of alternative 
payment models for different configurations of ACOs and to disseminate learning 
about the most effective strategies. 
10b. CMS should work with other payers to develop robust information exchanges and 
standardized reports that can provide ACOs with timely feedback on comparative 
results, support rapid-cycle improvements in quality and cost performance, and 
develop new knowledge on effective and efficient clinical practices. 
10c. The Department of Health and Human Services, through its Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, should provide technical 
assistance on implementation of electronic information systems and exchanges to 
facilitate transfer of critical clinical information. 
10d. CMS should create toolkits of interventions and practices that health care 
organizations have found effective in improving quality and lowering costs. All 
payers should collaborate to provide technical assistance to organizations to help 
them identify and adopt effective and efficient practices and to spread successful 
innovations in payment methods and organizational models. 
10e. Every effort should be made by public and private payers, as well as providers, to 
ensure transparency of information and to minimize administrative complexity. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. health care delivery system should be accountable for three things: delivering 
high-quality, effective, and safe care that contributes to the best possible population 
health outcomes; configuring itself for the benefit of patients and providing excellent 
patient experiences with care; and using resources as efficiently as possible. By adopting 
those as core values and achieving increasingly stringent goals in each area, it should be 
possible in the future to ensure that all Americans—including the growing population of 
patients with one or more chronic conditions—have access to affordable health care for 
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the prevention of illness, the restoration of health for those with acute conditions, and the 
maintenance of health and productivity. 
 
To accomplish this, health care delivery in the United States will require new 
organizational structures. While those structures will vary depending on the local 
conditions, existing health care delivery elements, and population characteristics, each 
must be designed to be accountable for its performance. Since each organization will 
need to encompass many existing stakeholders, and since each needs to be responsive 
first to the needs of individuals and the public as a whole, the governance of the 
organizations will need to be inclusive and participatory and develop strategies that 
benefit both the population served and the participating stakeholders. These organizations 
will need not only a structural skeleton but the equivalent of a nervous system that 
enables each part of the organization to receive and share information in such a way that 
meets the needs of all participants. The organization will need to provide or arrange to 
provide other systems with capable technical support for diverse activities such as well-
coordinated, patient-centered care (e.g., care coordinators), comprehensive preventive 
services (e.g., community and patient outreach), and enhancement of operational 
efficiency (e.g., Lean methods). 
 
The ACO model shows significant promise in helping to transform the U.S. health 
system to achieve these aims. But much work needs to be done to establish ACOs, make 
sure they are able to achieve the goals of the program, and spread the model so that all 
Americans are able to access this type of care. It will require development of trust among 
all the parties, and willingness to test multiple approaches, measure results, and adapt 
rapidly to improve performance. Government leadership and flexibility are essential, as 
are activated and engaged clinicians and patients who embrace accountability for better 
care and health outcomes. If all this occurs, accountable care organization s can play an 
instrumental role in achieving a high performance U.S. health system over the coming 
decade. 
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